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The 2010 Nagoya Protocol under the Convention on Biological Diversity and
recent changes in the policies of major international conservation organiza-
tions highlight current interest in revisiting the moral case for conservation.
Concerns with equity and human rights challenge well-established notions of
justice centered on human responsibility toward nature, the common good or
the rights of future generations. This review introduces an empirical approach
to the analysis of justice and shows how conservation scientists can apply it to
ecosystem services-based governance (or in short, ecosystem governance). It
identifies dominant notions of justice and points out their compatibility with
utilitarian theories of justice. It then discusses the limited appropriateness of
these notions in many contexts in which conservation takes place in the Global
South and explores how technical components of ecosystem governance influ-
ence the realization of the notions in practice. The review highlights the need
for conservation scientists and managers to analyze the justice of ecosystem
governance in addition to their effectiveness and efficiency. Justice offers a
more encompassing perspective than equity for the empirical analysis of con-
servation governance.
Introduction
There are strong reasons to take a fresh look at justice
in conservation now. Most fundamentally, conservation
remains a deeply ethical undertaking, having concerns
for the common good, nature and the prospects of fu-
ture generations at its core. The significance of justice
concerns and current interest in revisiting past justifica-
tions of conservation find illustration in the 2010 Nagoya
Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing under the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity. In addition, virtually all
major international conservation organizations have re-
cently revised their mission statements or issued new
policies to safeguard affected people’s rights in an effort
to recalibrate the balance between global and local inter-
ests (Martin et al. 2013a).
In addition, the spread of ecosystem services-based
governance (henceforth, “ecosystem governance”) brings
about a readjustment of rights and responsibilities in
conservation. This is because its analytical approach gen-
erates insights regarding the trade-offs between different
kinds of ecosystem services and between various kinds
of stakeholders, revealing that these are at the heart of
ecosystem management (Ronnback et al. 2007; Daw et al.
2011). Ecosystem governance seeks to resolve the trade-
offs in a new manner in order to enable effective
and lasting conservation. This applies to all forms of
ecosystem governance, such as Payments for Ecosystem
Services (PES), revenue-sharing mechanisms around
protected areas, and Reducing Emissions from Deforesta-
tion and Forest Degradation (REDD+).
The resolution of trade-offs can be interrogated from
a justice perspective (Luck et al. 2012; Chan & Satterfield
2013). Justice is about what is morally right, being “the
first virtue of social institutions” (Rawls 1971: p. 3).
Ecosystem governance is amenable to justice analysis
because it sets up relationships between stakeholders,
such as between the providers and users of ecosystem
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services. Governance affects the distribution of benefits
and duties among stakeholders and requires collective
decisions about the objectives of conservation iand the
methods to achieve these. This is important from a social
perspective, as governance should be not only effective
and efficient but also just (e.g., Bremer et al. 2014), and
from an ecological perspective, because the environmen-
tal behavior of stakeholders is likely to depend on how
they perceive the legitimacy and fairness of ecosystem
governance (Pascual et al. 2010; Muradian et al. 2013).
We argue in this review that this fresh look at justice
would benefit from what we call an empirical approach
(cf. Schlosberg 2007; Walker 2011; Sikor 2013a). An em-
pirical approach recognizes the plurality of justice in the
sense that more often than not, stakeholders do not agree
on a single definition of what is morally right (Martin
et al. 2013b). Another key premise is that notions of jus-
tice are contextual and experiential, in the sense that they
depend on the particular political and historical setting
and by the kinds of resources and responsibilities to be
shared (He & Sikor, under review). Empirical approaches
complement the normative approaches known from en-
vironmental ethics and distributive theories of justice
(e.g., Rawls 1971). A key difference is that empirical jus-
tice analysis does not start from a particular theoretical
position, such as Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness, but
instead starts from actual (empirical) claims about envi-
ronmental justice and the notions of justice used to sup-
port these. It investigates how certain notions of justice
find support in public discourse, how they may become
dominant, and may lose support again (Fraser 2009).
We begin our review by introducing the empirical ap-
proach at greater length. We subsequently apply it to
ecosystem governance, identifying dominant notions of
justice, examining their appropriateness in the contexts
where ecosystem governance takes place in the Global
South, and pointing out how technical governance fea-
tures influence their realization in practice. The review
combines a novel theoretical argument for the relevance
of justice analysis with purposefully selected examples
from recent research on the social dynamics of ecosystem
governance.
An empirical approach to justice in
ecosystem governance
The application of empirical justice analysis to ecosystem
governance involves two distinct but overlapping lines
of enquiry (cf. Sikor 2013b). First, conservation scientists
need to identify dominant notions of justice that accom-
pany ecosystem governance, examine how appropriate
these are in the contexts where conservation takes place,





individuals, groups, generations, 
non-human organisms, nature
Criteria
equality, need, merit, 
deservedness
Figure 1 A simple conceptual framework for characterizing notions of
justice.
Source: The authors, based on Sikor (2013a).
Establishing the interplay between notions, contexts, and
actual practice is crucial because the moral implications of
ecosystem governance become apparent only if we study
actual practices of governance within particular contexts.
The second line of enquiry is to characterize different
stakeholders’ notions of justice in particular contexts, ex-
plore their justification in public discourse, and determine
how some of these notions find or lose support in public
discourse. The study of justifications employed in public
discourse helps to distinguish between mere statements
of self-interest and notions of justice that are argued to
possess wider relevance. The underlying premise is that
in reality, there are often tensions between dominant no-
tions of justice and those of local stakeholders, and that
interactions between these ideas of justice are a major
social dynamic influencing the nature and outcomes of
ecosystem governance (Box 1).
An important element of the empirical approach is a
simple conceptual framework to characterize notions of
justice. We suggest three factors that help to understand
stakeholders’ notions: dimensions, subjects, and criteria
(Figure 1; cf. Sikor 2013a):
(1) Dimensions refer to how notions emphasize con-
cerns about distribution, participation or recognition
(cf. Schlosberg 2007; Fraser 2009). Distribution is
about the assignment of rights and responsibilities
among stakeholders. Participation is often referred
to as “procedural justice,” directing attention to the
roles of different stakeholders in decision making.
Recognition is about acknowledging people’s distinct
identities and histories and eliminating forms of cul-
tural domination of some groups over others.
(2) Subjects are the kinds of stakeholders considered to
possess rights or bear responsibilities, have a role in
decision making, deserve recognition, or are deserv-
ing of care from other stakeholders. Common exam-
ples in conservation are the local poor, entire local
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populations, indigenous peoples, global society, fu-
ture generations, nonhuman organisms, and nature.
(3) Criteria are decision-making guidelines that orga-
nize the relationship between subjects for particular
dimensions of justice. Typical criteria are equality,
need, merit, and deservedness. For example, distri-
bution of a natural resource among humans can be
equal, needs based, or made to depend on merit.
Box 1: Justice and the ecological outcomes of PES
in Rwanda.
Nyungwe National Park covers more than 900
km2 of lower montane forests and hosts a number of
threatened and endemic species, including the owl-
faced monkey. The forest has lost its apex grazers
(buffalo and elephants) over the past few decades,
and may have lost the leopard, its apex carnivore.
The losses have been due to human pressure be-
cause the region is densely populated, living stan-
dards are low and natural resources remain a key
source of livelihood. The Park is subject to various
human uses, particularly hunting with snares, tree
cutting, and mining.
A trial PES scheme provided financial incentives
for local people from 2009 to 2012 to reduce hu-
man activity in the Park. Detailed community con-
sultations helped to elicit local notions of justice and
to incorporate them in the key features of the PES
design. As a result, specific conservation indicators,
performance targets and payment distribution var-
ied from site to site. For example, one community
chose to manage the majority of payments commu-
nally for the provision of public goods. In other sites,
people felt it more just for most of the payments to
be distributed equally among all households.
The PES trial led to significantly improved eco-
logical outcomes compared to the rest of the park.
However, similar improvements were also achieved
in matched locations in which traditional park mon-
itoring was increased. The main difference between
the PES sites and these matched sites was signifi-
cantly improved local attitudes toward the park. This
change in attitudes might mean that the increase
in ecological outcomes is more robust in the longer
term in the PES sites compared to the matched sites.
This suggests that PES schemes may not only en-
hance the moral case for conservation but also lead
to more sustainable ecological outcomes if their de-
sign is compatible with local notions of justice.
Sources: Gross-Camp et al. (2012), Martin et al.
(2014)
This simple conceptual framework helps to contrast
and compare a wide range of justice notions, from deep
green to those centered on individual human rights. For
example, deep green positions (e.g., “justice to nature”)
tend to consider nature or nonhuman species as subjects
of justice and accord them equal status to human beings
(e.g., Naess 1990). Proponents of intergenerational justice
juxtapose the current generation to future ones as sub-
jects, often demanding an egalitarian distribution of rights
and responsibilities between them (e.g., World Commis-
sion on Environment and Development 1987). Demands
for universal human rights typically emphasize individ-
ual people are bearers of rights, combining the demand
for equal procedural rights with a distribution that allows
everyone to meet basic material needs (cf. Sen 2009).
Empirical justice analysis is different from existing em-
pirical assessments of equity (e.g., Timko & Satterfield
2008; McDermott et al. 2013; Pascual et al., forthcoming).
First, as indicated above, justice analysis is able to cap-
ture a wider range of ethical positions than equity assess-
ments, such as concerns for ecological stewardship, the
rights of nonhuman species and responsibilities to future
generations—ethical concerns at the heart of conserva-
tion. Second, equity assessments typically center on local
outcomes, such as the level of payments, their relative
size in comparison with incurred costs, and distribution
among resource managers (e.g., Muradian et al. 2010).
In contrast, our approach attends to dynamics at local,
national, and global scales by considering stakeholders
beyond local resource managers. Third, justice analysis
pays particular attention to the relationship between duty
bearers and rights holders, such as between contempo-
rary resource managers and future generations. This is
often missing in assessments of local equity due to a more
narrow preoccupation with local stakeholders and the
distribution of benefits (e.g., Garcı´a-Amado et al. 2011).
In the following, we show how conservation scientists
might apply this empirical justice approach to ecosystem
governance, organizing our discussion along the first line
of enquiry introduced above. We begin by identifying
dominant notions of justice associated with ecosystem
governance and pointing out their compatibility with
utilitarian theories of justice. We then examine their
appropriateness in the contexts in which conservation
takes place. In a third step, we investigate how aspects
of the technical design of conservation affect how these
dominant notions play out in practice.
Dominant notions of justice in
ecosystem governance
Ecosystem governance in its theoretically ideal form
tends to set up the relationships between involved stake-
holders according to a distinct model (e.g., Ferraro 2001;
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Wunder 2005). The focus is on the providers and users
of ecosystem services as well as the assignment of man-
agement duties and rewards to providers in relation to
the benefits derived by users and contributions made by
them. Key stakeholders are various kinds of people and
social groups within a particular locality, country, or even
worldwide. Providers and users are assumed to interact
with each other on the basis of marginal utility, in which
ecosystem services can be secured where at least one user
values the service higher than at least one provider ex-
pects to receive. This is the ideal model in the sense of a
guiding image, even though actual governance practices
often depart significantly from the abstract model.
There are various PES projects and programs around
the world that illustrate the basic tenets of this model
despite variations in their specific designs (e.g., Engel
et al. 2008; Wunder et al. 2008). For example, China’s
central government has provided large funds to pay
for the protection of upper watersheds since 1999 (He
& Sikor, under review). The Sloping Land Conversion
Program provides seedlings and payments to farmers in
upper watersheds for growing trees on land that they pre-
viously used for cultivation. The stated rationale is that
upstream farmers provide important services to down-
stream people, and that farmers should be compensated
for the losses incurred in the switch from cultivation to
tree plantations. Participation in the Program is voluntary
in principle, allowing farmers to opt out if the compen-
sation does not cover their costs. Another illustration of
the ecosystem governance model are the global, national
and local REDD+ initiatives, which are intended to
address the trade-off between forest conservation and
the provision of agricultural crops, timber, etc.
These examples demonstrate how our proposed con-
ceptual framework helps to reveal the dominant notions
of justice that are associated with ecosystem governance
in its ideal form. First, it reveals the focal dimension to
be distribution, in the form of the assignment of manage-
ment duties, rewards, benefits, and contributions. Sec-
ond, it shows the most important subjects of justice to
be the users and providers of ecosystem services, i.e.,
contemporary individuals. Third, the critical criterion
used for organizing the relationship between users and
providers is one of merit defined as marginal utility. The
overall management objective, the duties and rewards of
providers, and the benefits and contributions of users are
all defined on the basis of marginal utility.
These dominant notions are compatible with utilitar-
ian theories of distributive justice as long as “they im-
prove overall human well-being,” as Chan & Satterfield
(2013) have pointed out. A central branch of utilitari-
anism considers social actions to be just if the generated
welfare gains outweigh any connected losses (e.g., Mill
1998). Such actions are morally right even if they make
some stakeholders worse off. Ecosystem governance in its
ideal form meets this moral requirement because volun-
tary interactions between providers and users lead to the
maximization of aggregate utility.
Examining the appropriateness of
justice notions in particular contexts
The second element of an empirical justice analysis is to
examine how utilitarian notions of distributive justice are
appropriate to the contexts in which conservation takes
place. Even if ecosystem governance holds theoretical po-
tential to serve justice and may realize this potential in
some contexts, it may still fail to do so in others. Evi-
dence suggests that the appropriateness of utilitarian no-
tions depends on certain preconditions that are often not
present in the Global South.
Conservation in the Global South often takes place
in settings of pronounced economic inequality. Where
some people live at or below a level of sustainable
subsistence it is hard to justify applying notions of
justice that emphasize the aggregate good irrespective of
distributional effects. In such situations, environmental
governance guided by utilitarian theory may displace
marginalized people from land and exclude them from
key sources of subsistence and income (Adams et al.
2004). Even where environmental interventions afford
a new source of income in compensation for incurred
losses, local people may lose some of their ability to
respond to future opportunities or shocks (Fisher 2013).
Or, better-off local stakeholders within generally poor
populations may take advantage of new sources of
income and accumulate further advantages (Daw et al.
2011). Moreover, governance that generates benefits
mostly to global or northern stakeholders may not
meet utilitarian standards, even where it does not make
anyone worse off in the South (Martin et al. 2013a).
The reason is that increases in income in the North may
not maximize global well-being due to differences in
marginal utility between North and South: because an
additional pound has a more significant effect on the
well-being of the poor than that of affluent people, global
well-being increases more if the pound is spent in the
South (Hicks et al. 2009). Similarly, it has been observed
that increases in inequality can diminish well-being even
when everybody’s income rises (Clark et al. 2008).
Similarly, unequal power relations challenge the ap-
propriateness of utilitarian notions of justice where
ecosystem governance departs from the pure market
model by involving intermediaries such as governments
and NGOs. Stakeholders are in different positions to
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influence decisions over what overall amount of ecosys-
tem services provision is desirable, and what modalities
apply to individual provision. In most settings, the demo-
cratic principle of “one person, one vote” does not ap-
ply even where local people are invited to participate
in environmental decision making or take part in polit-
ical affairs as citizens. For example, local elites have been
found to dominate decisions over watershed governance
in India (Vira et al. 2012) and afforestation projects in
Mexico (Corbera et al. 2007). Similarly, local elites and
international conservation organizations often determine
the objectives and modalities of environmental gover-
nance in the South, failing to empower disadvantaged
people or even marginalizing them further (Clements et
al. 2010; Leggett & Lovell 2012).
Another important limitation on the appropriateness
of dominant justice notions is simply that the involved
stakeholders may not share them. For some stakehold-
ers distributive issues may be secondary to recognition,
such as access to spiritual sites (Martin et al. 2013a; Sikor
2013c) and the preservation of cultural lifestyles, cus-
tomary visions of desirable environmental management
and traditional knowledge (Turner et al. 2008). Others
may assert the significance of procedural justice by de-
manding their involvement in decision making, for ex-
ample, through consultative processes (Gross-Camp et al.
2012). Similarly, stakeholders may define the subjects of
justice differently, for example, by considering the rights
of future generations or attributing independent ethical
standing to nature (e.g., Litzinger 2004). Ecosystem gov-
ernance divorces concerns about distributive among con-
temporary stakeholders from concerns about distribution
to future generations, even though intra- and intergen-
erational matters have been viewed as closely associated
since the Brundtland Report (World Commission 1987).
Stakeholders may also disagree with the dominant jus-
tice criterion of merit, or that merit is defined as marginal
utility. They may invoke notions of justice built on the
conviction that ecosystem governance has to contribute
to overcoming entrenched economic, political, and cul-
tural inequalities by emphasizing needs over merit. For
example, their demands may reflect Rawls’ (1971) prin-
ciple that any inequalities in distribution should favor the
least well-off, i.e., that ecosystem governance should help
diminish the gap between poor and rich. Alternatively,
they may give priority to ensuring that all people can
achieve a minimum livelihood threshold along the lines
of Sen’s (2009) capabilities approach. Such “pro-poor”
orientations are common to much ecosystem governance
in practice. For example, China’s Sloping Land Conver-
sion Programme emphasizes poverty alleviation next to
watershed protection as an overarching goal, a combina-
tion found in policy texts, expressed by local officials and
supported by villagers (He & Sikor, under review). Like-
wise, the Mexican and Ecuadorian governments consider
equity concerns together with environmental objectives
in the design and implementation of PES (Pattanayak
et al. 2010; Bremer et al. 2014).
Thus, the appropriateness of dominant justice notions
in ecosystem governance depends on certain precondi-
tions, in particular the presence of a reasonably level
playing field and general consent to the primacy of utili-
tarian theories of distributive justice. Such preconditions
are often not present in the Global South. The limited ap-
propriateness of utilitarian notions is reflected in the ris-
ing popularity of rights-based approaches to conservation
(Greiber et al. 2009). Rights-based approaches in their
ideal forms derive from other notions of justice that em-
phasize meeting a minimum threshold for affected people
(Martin et al. 2013a).
The influence of technical design
features on the realization of justice
notions
The third element in our empirical justice analysis is
to consider how technical design features of ecosystem
governance influence how justice notions are realized
in practice. Of particular interest here are the key pa-
rameters of ecosystem governance: (1) the identification
of trade-offs and affected stakeholders, (2) measurement
of ecosystem service flows and (3) definition of benefits
made available to providers. They all have direct implica-
tions for justice as technical as they may appear at first
sight (Sikor 2013c).
The identification of trade-offs and of affected
stakeholders bears direct influence on the justice of
ecosystem governance in its distributive, procedural and
recognition dimensions (cf. Hirsch et al. 2010). Distribu-
tive effects arise from the kinds of ecosystem services
considered in the trade-off. Certain services of impor-
tance to some stakeholders (e.g., agroforestry products)
may get lost when the identification of the trade-off
focuses on other services (e.g., carbon storage vs. land
for cultivation; Lansing 2011). Effects on procedural
justice arise from the decision making procedures em-
ployed to identify the trade-off and the desirable level of
ecosystem services provision. The procedures can rely on
scientific expertise, multistakeholder processes or other
means, having different implications for the opportunity
to participate of various stakeholders (Munda 2008;
Garmendia & Pascual 2013). Issues of recognition arise
because stakeholders may hold different visions of the
ecosystem, have different histories in their engage-
ment with the ecosystem and apply different types of
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knowledge and practices to management (Hirsch et al.
2010; Forsyth & Sikor 2013).
The measurement of ecosystem services flows also cre-
ates implications for justice. Measurement can have dis-
tributive implications since the employed methodologies
tend to capture some changes in ecosystem services flows
and fail to do so for others. Using REDD+ as an exam-
ple, the measurement of carbon stocks by way of re-
mote sensing yields a wide range of estimates depending
on the remote imagery and processing technology em-
ployed (Qureshi et al. 2012). Changes in carbon stocks
due to forest degradation are chronically difficult to mea-
sure by way of remote sensing technology, which means
that some types of forest management employed by par-
ticular stakeholders are easier to capture than others
(Mertz et al. 2012). Both measurement problems cause
direct distributive effects because some protection of car-
bon stocks undertaken by some stakeholders are captured
and eventually rewarded, whereas others are not (Sikor
2013c). In addition, measurement methodologies have
different effects on participation and recognition. Partic-
ipatory forest monitoring offers more opportunities for
various kinds of stakeholders to participate in the gener-
ation of data and validate different forms of knowledge
than expert-driven carbon monitoring (Danielsen et al.
2013; Sikor 2013c).
Similarly, the choice of benefits made available to
providers creates justice effects because determining the
kinds of transferred benefits involves questions of so-
cial value. Whose values come to matter raises issues of
recognition, particularly where monetary payments are
used in local systems of exchange that are not fully mon-
etized (Muradian et al. 2010). Monetary payments may
cause detrimental effects on the cultural values that local
people attribute to forests, something that is often dis-
cussed as crowding out of intrinsic values (Vatn 2010;
Narloch et al. 2012; Garcı´a-Amado et al. 2013). Monetary
transfers may even amount to bribery where local people
face economic, political, and cultural discrimination and
may not have much choice but to accept payments in re-
turn for foregoing demands of recognition of their own
cultural values (Martin et al. 2013a). However, in other
contexts, monetary payments may also serve to enhance
the values stakeholders attach to ecosystems (Karky &
Skutsch 2010).
Conclusions: ecosystem governance and
justice
Justice is an integral feature of ecosystem governance
because governance almost always has moral implica-
tions, be it changes in the distribution of rights and
responsibilities, people’s participation in decision mak-
ing or the recognition of their particular identities and
histories. As a consequence, ecosystem governance typi-
cally incorporates elements designed to serve justice, such
as voluntary interactions between users and providers
of ecosystem services or compensation mechanisms. Yet,
the justice-relevant elements go beyond those explicitly
dedicated to bringing about justice or avoiding injustice.
They extend to ostensibly technical design features since
those may cause effects on distribution, participation, or
recognition.
Thus, it is important for conservation scientists to ana-
lyze the justice of ecosystem governance in theory and
practice, just like its effectiveness and efficiency. Em-
pirical justice analysis offers a more encompassing per-
spective than existing equity assessments due to the
consideration of a wider range of moral concerns, atten-
tion to dynamics at local, national and global scales, and
reflection on the relationship between right holders and
duty bearers.
Application of empirical justice analysis to ecosystem
governance can produce new insights for conservation
scientists. Perhaps most importantly, attention to jus-
tice indicates why stakeholders support ecosystem gov-
ernance even though it requires them to forego certain
resource uses. For example, rural Rwandans back the
conservation of biodiversity even though they have
to give up hunting, tree-cutting and mining (Box 1).
Upland farmers in China champion the conversion of
agricultural fields to tree plantations for watershed pro-
tection although trees yield lower incomes than agricul-
tural crops (He Jun & Sikor, under review). In addition,
attention to stakeholders’ notions of justice helps to illu-
minate the causes of conservation conflicts because con-
flicts are often due to competing ideas about what is just
or unjust (Redpath et al. 2013). It helps to explain the
frequent phenomenon that governments favor egalitar-
ian distributions in PES (Pattanayak et al. 2010): govern-
ments may combine environmental with redistributive
goals because utilitarian notions may find little support
in public discourse. It also helps to understand why some
participants in PES resist the implementation of ecosys-
tem governance (Vira et al. 2012): they may not con-
sider the underlying utilitarian ideas morally right. This
applies to both users of ecosystem services who question
the moral case for paying resource managers (Porras et al.
2008) as well as resource managers who emphasize the
moral standing of rights to a minimum livelihood or self-
determination (Ibarra et al. 2011).
These insights demonstrate how conservationists can
benefit from practical applications of an empirical jus-
tice approach in the future. Conservationists may develop
applied tools that help stakeholders to verbalize their
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notions of justice, acknowledge any differences and
transform conflicts (e.g., Gritten et al. 2009). They may
gain from applying operational procedures compatible
with various notions of justice beyond the rights-based
approaches of current interest (e.g., Greiber et al. 2009).
Attention to justice may even open up a new plat-
form for dialogue between proponents and critics of
ecosystem governance, the latter including those who
are concerned about the exclusion of local people (e.g.,
Brockington & Igoe 2006) and others dedicated to meet-
ing human obligations toward nonhuman species and
nature (e.g., Doak et al. 2013). Once both proponents
and critics realize their shared commitment to justice and
make their attachments to particular notions of justice
explicit, they may be better able to engage in a construc-
tive dialogue. After all, they all believe in the power of
justice as a motive for human action.
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